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COMMENTARY

The Military Commissions Act,

Coerced Confessions, and
the Role of the Courts
PETER MARGULIES
A society's treatment of those it considers to be the "worst of the worst" is an
accurate measure of its integrity and
strength. Cutting corners can signal that
a society lacks confidence in its highest
ideals. The Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA)' is a case in point, posing a
challenge to a core principle of American
justice: that courts should not admit evidence yielded by coerced interrogation.
Judicial skepticism about such evidence
pre-dates the American Constitution,
driven then as now by the unreliability
of such evidence and its corrosive effect
on government institutions. Abandoning
that principle would undermine a core
premise of the American legal system
and compromise our standing with the
rest of the world. Fortunately, courts will
often find interpretive space under the
MCA to uphold fundamental principles.
When that space runs out, courts can
invoke their inherent power to protect
the integrity of judicial proceedings and
resort to the Constitution itself.
The MCA and Admission of
Evidence Obtained Through
Coercion
After the Supreme Court, in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,2 struck down the President's
military commissions, Congress filled
the vacuum by passing the MCA. The
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MCA provided more concrete rules on
the question of the tribunal's ability to
proceed in the defendant's absence. It also
provided rules on the defendant's ability
to see evidence against him. In addition,
the MCA included a number of provisions
on the admissibility of evidence obtained
through coercion.
The MCA's provisions regarding the
admissibility of evidence obtained by
coercion are three-fold. Under the MCA, a
tribunal must suppress evidence obtained
through torture, defined as treatment
intended to cause "severe pain." In cases
where the pain caused is "serious," but
not "severe,'; the tribunal should admit
evidence if it is reliable, probative, and
serves the interests of justice. Finally, for
evidence obtained on or after December
30, 2005, the MCA provides that courts
should admit statements that are reliable, probative, and were not obtained
through "cruel, unusual, and inhumane
treatment" that would violate the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution.
The United States, International
Law, and Torture after
September 11
These provisions are necessary because
of the apparent abusive treatment of
detainees that occurred after the attacks
of September 11, 2001, and lasted at least
through 2003. During this time, the United States, primarily through the CIA but
also through some military personnel, en-
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gaged in a spectrum of practices designed
to produce information, elicit confessions, and "break" detainees. These practices included water-boarding, in which a
detainee is tied supine to a board, his face
is covered, and interrogators pour water
over his face to simulate drowning. Other
practices included prolonged standing,
the protracted use of stress positions in
which the subject stands on tip-toes or
leans against a wall supporting himself
by his fingertips, sleep deprivation lasting for two days or more, and exposure
to extremes of hot and cold.
These "alternative methods" of interrogation, as the Bush Administration
has described them, have produced only
modest results. Accounts of the interrogation of Al Qaeda figures indicate that
normal interrogation methods yielded
useful information, but that escalating
tactics to include alternative methods
produced little data of value about
impending attacks. Moreover, many
detainees at Guantdnamo and elsewhere
are either foot-soldiers in the Taliban, terrorist wannabees, or simply people in the
wrong place at the wrong time offered up
for bounty. Even if inclined to talk, they
often have little information to impart.
International law has increasingly
frowned on coercive methods of interrogation, stressing their harshness against
the backdrop of their lack of efficacy.
Barred by the Convention Against Torcontinuedon
page 54
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ture and customary international law,
torture is a violation of jus cogens, or fundamental legal norms. The ban on torture
has no exceptions. International tribunals
increasingly hold that lesser abuses such
as prolonged hooding and use of stress
positions are also prohibited as "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading" treatment.
As the United States ramps up the
military commissions at Guantanamo,
however, prosecutors may well seek to
introduce evidence obtained through
the use of "alternative methods." While
certain methods, such as waterboarding,
may arguably rise to the level of torture,
and thus be categorically inadmissible,
another provision of the MCA allows the
President to find that interrogation methods do not meet this definition. A court
may be obliged to defer to the President's
position under the administrative law
principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council.? Moreover, under the MCA,
detainees do not have direct recourse to
international law. However, the MCA
authorizes a court to exclude evidence
obtained through methods less severe
than torture, as long as it finds that the
evidence is not "reliable" or, for evidence
obtained recently and in the future, that
the methods used are not "cruel, unusual,
and inhumane" under the Constitution.
The MCA's Clash with the
American Legal Tradition
The MCA's apparent insistence on
a case-by-case inquiry into reliability conflicts with a core premise of the
Anglo-American legal tradition. For
centuries, English and American courts
have proclaimed their skepticism about
the reliability of coerced confessions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist said it best in
Dickerson v. United States,4 a case holding that Congress lacked the power to
supplant the warnings that the Court
mandated in Mirandav. Arizona' to guard
against the inherently coercive setting of
custodial interrogations. Commenting
on the provenance of this concern about
coercions expressed in cases under both
the Fifth Amendment privilege against
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self-incrimination and the Due Process
Clause, 6 Rehnquist observed that judicial
focus on the voluntariness of defendants'
statements to custodial authorities has
"roots in the common law, as the courts
of England and the United States recognized that coerced confessions are
inherently untrustworthy."7 The English
courts' recognition of the unreliability
of confessions "forced from the mind
by ... the torture of fear" pre-dates the
American Constitution, and was surely
familiar to the framers.
Although courts have often cited the
unreliability of such statements, they
have also looked more broadly to the
corrosive effect of coercion on the institutions of justice, government, and society.
Once tolerated, habits of coercion are
difficult to break. Indeed, such habits develop their own institutional momentum,
outliving any efficacy that "alternative
methods" may enjoy The spread of institutional acceptance may also exacerbate
political and social inequality, as officials
identify subjects of coercion, including
non-citizens, the poor, and groups subordinated on the basis of race, religion,
or ethnicity. The political branches often
give such institutional costs short shrift,
preferring, as in the MCA, to stress the
semblance of security over more abiding concerns. The result is a danger to
democratic governance at home, and to
reputation abroad. As the Supreme Court
has observed, "human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government
...
wrings a confession out of an accused
against his will."9 According to the Court,
a government pursuing legitimate interests in safety and security "must obey the
law while enforcing the law ... life and
liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves." 0
Courts do not have the luxury of
remaining indifferent to coercive methods. When they turn a blind eye to such
practices and preside over or affirm
judgments thus secured, they become
complicit in institutional decline. Permitting evidence obtained through coercion
to be admitted undermines the adversarial system that the Framers envisioned
as a bulwark of liberty, imposing an
"inquisitorial character"11 on American
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justice that transforms the judge from a
neutral referee to a partisan ally of the
government.
The cases demonstrate this concern
with torture. The notion of the person in
custody as helpless, without the means
to fairly counter coercion, is echoed in
cases from the 1800s to Miranda that
warn against granting the government
the power to "press the witness unduly,
...browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant,. . . push him into a corner, ... [and]
entrap [the witness] into false contradictions."12 In Bram v. United States,13 the
Supreme Court criticized the coercion
exercised against an accused who had
been stripped of his clothing, and against
whom the agents of the government
exercised "complete authority and control.1 4 The Court's description of power
relationships could apply equally to the
humiliation imposed more recently on
detainees at Abu Ghraib.
Coerced Witness Statements and
the Sixth Amendment
The role of the courts in policing coerced interrogation extends beyond the
Fifth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause. The Supreme Court has also
recently invoked the Sixth Amendment
to preclude the use of unreliable hearsay
against a criminal defendant. In Crawford
v. Washington and Davis v. Washington, the
Supreme Court traced a long line of Anglo-American cases driven by skepticism
about the reliability of statements made
by potential witnesses subject to government interrogation. For the Court, the
"[i]nvolvement of government officers
in the production of testimony with an
eye toward trial presents unique potential for . . abuse." 5 The Court cited the
treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603,
which used out-of-court statements of
dubious reliability to prove a case based
more on political expediency than legal
merit. According to the Court, those
statements are unreliable because they
are the product of governmental influence and agendas, not the spontaneous
recollection of disinterested individuals.
In the military commission context, the
statements most likely to be introduced
are statements made by fellow detainees
while in custody. Since those statements
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are also the product of custodial interrogation, and possibly of mistreatment,
they are also unreliable. In the ordinary
criminal law context, their introduction
at trial would clearly run afoul of the
Court's reinvigorated interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause. Permitting such evidence to
bolster verdicts in military commissions
would transform those tribunals into
up-dated Star Chambers, clashing with
the ideals of fairness that form the face
of American justice for the world.
Interpreting the MCA to Deter
Coerced Interrogation
Because of these concerns, federal courts
hearing challenges to military commission verdicts should play a robust role in
ensuring that the commissions, as well as
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) that have been convened for the
other GuantAnamo detainees, exclude
evidence obtained by coercion. In many
cases, courts can do this through simply
enforcing the MCA as written. As noted,
the MCA requires that tribunals exclude
unreliable testimony Citing the lines of
precedent stemming from Due Process,
Fifth Amendment, and Confrontation
Clause concerns, courts should hold that
evidence obtained through coercion has
been shown to be unreliable, and should
therefore exclude such evidence. Solidifying this interpretation of the MCA, courts
may invoke the avoidance canon, which
holds that courts should construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional problems. Courts can also exclude evidence
obtained after 2005 by finding that interrogation methods violate constitutional
protections against "cruel, unusual, or
inhumane treatment."
In cases in which the evidence produced by coercive interrogation before
2006 is corroborated by documentary or
other sources, courts will have greater
difficulty in relying on the MCA's language, which seems to require admission
of evidence that is reliable. Moreover,
courts have been reluctant to import
rigid constitutional standards into cases
involving investigation or trial outside
the United States, particularly when
those cases concern foreign nationals.
Judicial review of military commission
verdicts may oblige courts to confront

the difficult issue of the Constitution's
application abroad.
Coercive Interrogation and the
Constitution's Application Abroad
The Supreme Court has rejected the
absolutist view that the Constitution applies with equal force here and abroad.
Practical impediments to such blanket
coverage have driven the courts to a
more pragmatic approach. However,
despite rejecting an absolutist view of
the extraterritorial application of constitutional guarantees, courts have imposed
significant constraints on government
overreaching, particularly in the area of
fundamental rights. Moreover, courts
have recognized that violating fundamental rights abroad to gain an advantage in a United States tribunal threatens
the legal system's integrity.
When dealing with evidence obtained
by foreign governments prior to a defendant's trial in United States courts, courts
have invoked their supervisory power
over government law enforcement and
applied the "shock the conscience" test.
The Supreme Court announced this test
in the pre-Mirandacase of Rochin v. California16 to forbid the warrantless stomachpumping of a suspect. Applying this test
to the extraterritorial context, courts have
looked to the degree of coercion used by
agents of foreign governments, and in at
least one case disallowed evidence obtained through egregious physical abuse
of the defendant. Since the courts apply
the "shock the conscience" standard to
conduct byforeign governments, this test
should be a floor for assessing United
States conduct at home or abroad. Indeed,
Judge Henry Friendly, for whom Chief
Justice John Roberts once served as a law
clerk, noted in Birdsell v. United States17
that courts could exercise their supervisory authority to prevent federal officials
from leveraging abusive conduct abroad
into a strategic advantage at trial.
Moreover, judges have often been
pragmatic in marking the scope of the
Constitution's extraterritorial applicability, sending signals that the government
must observe fundamental rights. In
Downes v. Bidwell,i" one of the Insular
Cases, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution did not apply across the
board to a territory such as Puerto Rico.
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Accordingly, the Court upheld a duty
imposed on goods shipped from Puerto
Rico which would otherwise have violated the Constitution. However, the Court,
in its plurality opinion, also indicated
that residents of territories would retain
core rights granted under the Constitution and rooted in natural law, including
a right to due process and to the protection of "life, liberty, and property."
In more recent cases, pragmatic concurrences played a significant role. In Reid
v. Covert,19 for example, Justice Harlan's
concurrence recognized that due process
required a jury trial in a capital prosecution involving the spouse of an American serviceman located abroad. Harlan
argued that, given the stakes involved,
this safeguard was necessary to ensure
the fairness and independence of the tribunal. The admission of coerced evidence
poses an analogous threat to the integrity
of the military commissions involving
Guantinamo detainees.
Similarly, in United States v. VerdugoUrquidez,2 Justice Kennedy's concurrence
asserted that the warrantless seizure of
a Mexican national in Mexico by United
States authorities for the purpose of
bringing the defendant to trial in the
United States was appropriate. Kennedy
observed that the vagaries of foreign
criminal justice systems could make
invocation of the warrant requirement
impractical. However, Justice Kennedy
noted that the defendant was clearly
entitled to due process protections for
his United States trial. Further, Kennedy
suggested that due process would also
protect the defendant while in Mexico
from abusive conduct by United States
officials. While Kennedy concluded that
a warrantless seizure did not violate due
process, the logic of his opinion suggests that coercive interrogation would
impinge on core norms.
Faced with this logic, the executive
branch will doubtless resort again to the
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v.
Eisentrager,21 in which the Court rejected
a habeas petition from a German officer
convicted by a military tribunal convened
after World War II. However, one can read
Eisentragerto bolster the continued vitality of fundamental rights. As the Supreme
Court has recently observed in Rasul v.
Bush,22 the defendant in Eisentrager had

PeterMargulies /

the benefit of a trial before a military commission, which to all appearances was a
fair and accurate proceeding. Moreover,
the defendant did not allege that the
commission had considered evidence
obtained through coercion. Viewed from
this perspective, Eisentrageris consistent
with a pragmatic approach that permits
the government flexibility abroad, but
insists on the protection of fundamental
constitutional guarantees.
This extraterritorial protection of fundamental rights from abuse by federal
officials should apply in any forum in
which the defendant finds himself-territorial tribunal, military tribunal, or
Article III court. Admittedly, certain
procedural rights may not be present in
the first two forums, including a jury in
cases involving the trial of members of
the uniformed services or persons like
the Guantdnamo detainees accused of
violations of the law of war. Other distinctive features of United States jurisprudence, such as Miranda warnings, may
be impractical under Justice Kennedy's
analysis in Verdugo-Urquidez, because
interrogation may also entail exigent
attempts to prevent future acts of terror.
However, core rights, such as the right
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to a fair and accurate determination of
culpability and the right to freedom from
physical or serious psychological abuse,
should inhere in any context reviewed by
United States courts.
At this level of fundamental rights,
the courts could also bring international
law back in, to inform the court's interpretation of constitutional guarantees.
The status of torture as a violation of jus
cogens dovetails with the recognition in
The Insular Cases of fundamental norms
guaranteed under natural law and the
Constitution and with Harlan's recognition in Reid and Kennedy's recognition in
Verdugo-Urquidez of the abiding applicability of due process. The Court should
view the jus cogens status of torture, as
well as the increasingly disfavored status
of lesser forms of coercion, as barring
evidence obtained through tactics that
inflict pain.
Conclusion
Courts have an array of interpretive
tools at their disposal to reconcile the
MCA with abiding values that inform
the rule of law. First, courts can interpret the MCA to broadly construe the
meaning of "torture," and thus categorically exclude evidence obtained through

abusive treatment. Second, courts can
construe the statutory term "reliable"
narrowly, to exclude evidence such as
statements obtained through coercion
that Anglo-American courts have historically regarded as suspect. Third, courts
can use their supervisory power over
federal authorities to bar evidence obtained through methods that "shock the
conscience." Fourth, courts can hold that
the fundamental rights guaranteed in
the Due Process clause apply to military
commissions convened at Guantdnamo
and require the suppression of statements made under coercion by either
the defendant or by third parties such as
fellow detainees.
This array of interpretive tools has limits. The pragmatic jurisprudence outlined
above will not grant detainees a package
of rights identical to those enjoyed by
defendants in American civilian courts.
Indeed, mandating a rigid equivalence of
rights might deprive the government of
flexibility it needs to effectively combat
terrorism. A pragmatic approach will
grant the government this flexibility,
while obliging military commissions
to observe core norms that support the
rule of law.
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